Board of Directors of Guarantees for Interim Governance

Summary
SUSHI is in a very problematic governance situation, with the Frog Nation leaders having reputational issues and questionable management choice in other ventures being worked on.

Solutions such as having a Community Election of a new interim CEO has been proposed Community election of new interim CEO .

Abstract
We need a group of multiple stakeholders of guarantees and knowledge, that can be trusted among a variety of stakeholders (from sushi investors, to sushi developers, to sushi community at large), that would transition to a new community-lead governance with a new efficient organisational structure.

The new Board of Director of Guarantees will be taking care of implementing the proposal of organisation.

Motivation
Trust and confidence has to be reinforced as soon as possible in a way that’s not questionable and is not bound to the name of one single leader (in that case Mr. Daniele Sestagalli), being that choice fragile in governance and outcome.

Specification
Extend the community interim CEO proposal in bringing for interim management a Board of Directors made up of 5 members:

  • 1 member from the the current core team of SUSHI, nominated and elected by the people that are currently paid and full-time working on SUSHI and not involved in other DeFi projects.

  • 1 member nominated among the original founders of SUSHI, that does not work anymore at SUSHI, as a guarantee body. Voted by the currently working core team, only for paid and full-time working people not involved in other DeFi projects.

  • 2 member nominated with a public nomination process being collected and being publicly subject to voting, that should not have any SUSHI financial interests and cannot hold SUSHI during their duty (no Conflict of interests). The voting has to be based not on SUSHIPOWAH (see the limits Increase decentralisation for SUSHI DAO by eliminating SUSHIPOWAH Poll Proposal Restrictions) but based on the number of SUSHI wallets, one head, one vote. The SUSHI wallets voting it, must be holding SUSHI since at least 1 year.

  • 1 member representing the Investors / Venture Capitals, currently represented by SUSHIPOWAH (Total amount of Tokens owned, in the SUSHIPOWAH represented mix).

The new Board of Directors will be interim and will operate in a DAO inspired principles of distribution of powers, collection of interests and efficiency, by working on the governance structure.

The Board of Directors elected undertake radical transparency scrutiny rules, in order to disclose conflict of interests, as defined by the Transparency Framework for SUSHI A Transparency Framework Required for SUSHI new Governance .

For
Anyone that wish to have a trustable and guaranteed transition to a new organisation model.

Against
Anyone that wish to keep tight control on the Frog Nation leadership proposal being voted by 2 wallets for >90% of voting powers among 200 (see how 2 wallets control SUSHI Increase decentralisation for SUSHI DAO by eliminating SUSHIPOWAH Poll Proposal Restrictions - #6 by naif).

Poll

Do you like the idea of a Board of Directors as interim structure of Guarantees for Governance?
  • Yes
  • No

0 voters

1 Like

Very stupid. Large investors in sushi should not have their votes diminished to 1 otherwise you’ll very quickly find sushi dumped to 0.
Do not support this proposal. I understand the intent of what you’re trying to do in put the De in DeFi but this does not achieve that instead creates many consequences that you’re not considering.

You do not support the Board of Directors of Guarantee for Interim Governance, or you do not support the election of part of those by a Community-Lead voting count, rather than Capital-Lead voting count?

Do you think that “Investors” should have a dedicated Board of Directors voted by majority of Token Holding, specifically focused in representing Investors as a Stakeholders?

Only multi-stakeholders governances works for all, it means Investors cannot dictate the line (or SUSHI would be a VentureCapital based DeFi, that many challenge) by the Token Holding, but must have their say.

Given your contribution i would extend that:

  • Rather than 3, only 2 member nominated with a public nomination process, it would become 2
  • 1 member nominated by simple majority of Token Holding with current SUSHIPOWAH methods representing Investors/Venture Capital interests

Do you think would be more appropriate and balanced?

Fabio

1 Like

@naif - I am confused by your two separate proposals on the forum.

They both seem to tackle the same issue but are two different solutions. Are you more interested in changing the SUSHIPOWAH limits or creating this “Board of Directors of Guarantees”?

It seem best to prioritize one course of action before receiving more feedback.

1 Like

@fig - Let’s try to keep separate the SUSHIPOWAH limits from the Board of Directors (BOD) proposals, but also see how they inter-related.

SUSHIPOWAH represent the ultimate “Shareholder Voting Powers” of SUSHI.

A BOD, should be representing not only the “Shareholders” but also others SUSHI’s Stakeholders.

So, it’s in the interest of the holders of SUSHIPOWAH, that the BOD to determine the Organisational Governance of the project is a Multi Stakeholder representative body.

In order to be “Multi Stakeholder Representative” it means that the SUSHIPOWAH holders should not put themselves in the conditions to nominate/candidate/votes for all of the BOD names.

This means that, in the proposed schema of BOD (that can be questioned/discussed/changed), it’s anyhow relevant to have:

  • Representation of the Team (only Full Time working people)
  • Representation of the SUSHIPOWAH (investors)
  • Representation of the Original Founders (inspiring the mission and providing a guarantees)
  • Representation of Guarantee and Diversity (people from outside the SUSHI project)

Obviously, for each of those “Representative” you need to have a different Nomination/Candidature process and different Voting process, that can’t just rely entirely on SUSHIPOWAH.

I hope to have clarified the relationship of this proposal, between the SUSHIPOWAH and the BOD composition (made up of different Nomination/Candidature and Voting process).

Its clear that, such a composition, must be proposed for Voting, must be Voted and that the Voting outcome is decided by the few wallets that represent the majority of SUSHIPOWAH.

In practical terms, the majority investors of SUSHI project, should engage themselves in refining the BOD composition and nomination/voting and commit to that “Ad Interim Body” that empowers the different SUSHI stakeholders

Fabio

1 Like

Just want to applaud your unyielding resolve in solving the governance deadlock.

It could be argued that involving outside parties might skew the governance process (as imported parties may retain loyalties to board members we might not be aware of), but a robust decision making authority might be a way forward.

I think a business plan is necessary. After accepting one (how Sushi partecipate in liquidity war) we begin to choose the people who conform to the guiding principles and development criteria.
To leave, I think the board’s proposal is fine.

Flavio

While I appreciate the sentiment, this will simply lead to a sybil attack (one entity distributes SUSHI to many wallets and pretends to be several entities).