Increase decentralisation for SUSHI DAO by eliminating SUSHIPOWAH Poll Proposal Restrictions

In order to bring a proposal to be voted by SUSHI DAO, nowadays it’s required to have at least 100k SUSHIPOWAH accordingly to the following calculation:

1 xSushi = 1 sushipowah
1 SUSHI in eth-sushi LP = 2 sushi powah

At today xSushi price of $8.70, proposing something for vote in SUSHI DAO does require a capital/investment availability of $870.000 .

This capital is a barrier to formulate any proposal to the SUSHI DAO (not just the forum, the DAO voting official platform).

Strongly reduce gatekeeping by eliminating the entrance barriers and let anyone propose on-chain poll proposal.

Other more decentralizes and democratically contributed DAO, such as MakerDAO, enable anyone to propose on-chain Governance poll: Governance | MakerDAO Community Portal

SUSHI DAO have many aspects of “centralisation” that gives in the hands of few people (given their role in the organisation or given their ownership of SUSHI tokens) a lot of governance power, limiting grassroots decentralised DAO contribution.

Follow the DeFi spirit of Decentralisation of SUSHI:

  • Increasing participation
  • Increasing de-centralisation

Eliminate SUSHIPOWAH limits to DAO Governance Poll proposal.

Anyone that wish to really participate to SUSHI DAO as a newcomer or as a non-large-xsushi holder.

Anyone that may take advantage of large ownership of xsushi or anyone that may wish to hold the right to veto DAO governance proposal.


  • Do you want SUSHI DAO to enable unrestricted Governance Poll submission, removing the gatekeeping requirement to own 100.000 xSushi to submit a DAO Governance Poll proposal?
  • Yes, but before any new Governance is approved
  • Yes, but after any new Governance is approved
  • No

0 voters

1 Like

Hi @naif,

I appreciate the spirit of your proposal and would be in favour of lowering the xSUSHI threshold to submit proposals, but I don’t think removing it entirely is a good idea. If you do that, you most likely end-up with a very large amount of spam or vague/poorly crafted proposals (check the OHM snapshot page for an example), and having to do the filtering is quite a pain for people trying to be good DAO citizens and research and vote on each proposal.

Sorry, but as far as I know, there’s no minimum requirement. The only requirement is that your proposal aligns with the will of the group running the multisig/having rights to create snapshot polls. I have 100k SUSHI, but my forum proposal didn’t go anywhere :wink:

1 Like

Can’t you submit your proposal directly to snapshot?

Anyway, I think we can lower the threshold, but removing any restrictions would cause too much spam. I think there should be a fixed process with clear rules for making proposals on the forum. Like for example, if there are enough for votes in the forum poll and comments are mostly in favor, the core devs should be mandated to push the proposal to snapshot.

1 Like

With the new reorganisation proposals there’s a strong hierarchical structure, and the “soft law” rules defined by the leaders of various teams (operations, strategy, engineering) could develop influence on the Governance capabilities.

This means that in a balance and counter-balance equilibrium of power, part of any healthy governance, anyone have the right to have a say and gather the consensus.

It means anyone need to be able to subject to the DAO proposal to be voted, with a transparent and public review, in order to ensure the coherence/structure (like IETF doing RFC review in a public way) and the reduction of spam.

But removing the rights to directly subject to Vote DAO’s polls, hamper the grassroots contribution capabilities, de-facto not pursuing de-centralization goals.

We need to constructively address the two issues of:

  1. Spam
  2. Non consistent voting modification

Management of those issues

  1. Spam can be managed by just flagging as a Spam, with a publicly accessibile spam folder/category.
  2. Review, with public comments and message exchange, by a review board about the format to ensure consistency.

This equal to the work that the “legal office” of “parliaments” does, help politicians to gives consistency to policy proposals, we shall do the same, and in a transparent way.

Transparency is a key, like highlighted already here A Transparency Framework Required for SUSHI new Governance


Today 22/01 at 22:53 CET

The current vote on the Restructuring Proposal have 4.7M votes out of 5.5M represented by only 2 voters out of 218 voters:

Sushi Structural Proposal [Implementation]: Snapshot

0xe05A884D4653289916D54Ce6aE0967707c519879 and 0xa66f8Db3B8F1e4c79e52ac89Fec052811F4dbd19

seems to rule alone the voting power of SUSHI DAO.

1 Like

We’re in the age of governance bribes, so be prepared to see more of that, not only on Sushi.

I am new to this type of thing and understand how recent turmoil might invite drastic measures to reinvigorate the platform. However, I also think the spam comment made makes a whole lot of sense long term. This is a great setup. I get the impression that some people are trying to just do anything to pump the price for a quick exit. Seems like the team is regrouping and on track to build a business. Market, post, let people know what’s going on. It is going to be fine. Why I just vote NO.

While I think there is a clear concentration of voting power, I am not ready to eliminate the SUSHIPOWAH proposal limit.

It may be best to be lowered - but not to zero.

As asset prices drop, these thresholds become more accessible. I would point the forum to Terra which had a similar discussion about lowering the proposing threshold.

At the moment, it requires a core team member for the vote to be binding. This seems a bit rigid.