Sushi Organization Structure & Transparency

Summary of Discord Discussions by cash aka xasd

Most of these points revolve around transparency, incentives, and compensation.

Community wants:

  • Greater transparency into the role & ownership of core.
  • To be informed on external deals exceeding over a certain threshold.
  • Greater accounting transparency of ops wallet, probably quarter to quarter high level reports.
  • Transparency around product delays and blockers
  • An easy way to find opportunities for contribution within the DAO.
  • More investment into BD, Marketing, PR, and Design
  • More involvement of core members in community channels and discussions (a symptom of under-sourcing)

Core needs:

  • Greater headcount, greater total compensation, and transparent bonus structure that aligns and rewards incentives.
  • Devs and other members are being poached by other organizations that can offer greater compensation and benefits.

Some of xasd’s thoughts:
The Sushi treasury currently sits at $67 million — we should not be losing our members to other organizations , bc of compensation, and people should not be putting in 100+ hours a week with this type of capital and talented community at disposal. Overworking leads to being burned out and making mistakes.

Let’s keep in mind that sushi is one of the largest dao. DAO coordination/organization is still a very new problem space. Problems are natural and solutions will take time as we learn more as the biggest mover in this space. Let’s focus on building a better future & working together — we all want the same thing.

Shoutout to everyone who participated in the discussion and making their thoughts known :heart:

Some proposals are floating around internally and within the community. Let this be a place for discussion and collaboration


As a small Sushi owner and community member from before the liquidity migration event here’s my take:

On Transparency

There needs to be a clear framework of the following:

  • Decisions made by the team without input from holders & community, with a published framework so the community knows how they were made (for example, who has final say, is it a vote, etc.). Not all decisions need to be public either.

  • Decisions made by the team with input from holders & community that do not rise to an on-chain vote (like the Samurais website, who is voting on that, who is doing what)

  • Significant protocol, treasury, or other decisions which require formal on-chain vote

I get it completely as we discussed in the Thanksgiving Sushi Forum, for velocity purposes, things just need to get decided by the team, not by thousands of people. No one wants to take that away, but it should be much more transparent of a process.

On Compensation

I’m supportive of higher comp for strategic roles, and sympathetic to the fact that we need more doers, and doers need to get paid. There’s plenty of talkers on Twitter and Discord who don’t do jack.

That being said, I think we need a few mechanisms, that may not all be community and holder decision, but there should be transparency.

I also believe that some portion of compensation, say 20% should be paid in Sushi (use the 200 DMA), and tied to certain clear or quantifiable objectives (deploy SushiSwap DEX on X protocol or increase average number of ETH traders as shown on Dune Analytics by 25% by YE). These objectives could have scales.

Ex: Your comp is $200K stable, of that $40K is in Sushi. If you don’t hit your metrics, you can earn say as little as 25% of the $40K, but if you blow out your metrics, I’m fine giving that person 5x the $40K as long as it’s transparent, trackable, and quantifiable.

For the top positions at Sushi, which we can for simplicity purposes rank by comp level, I would suggest the objectives, and attainment of it be completely transparent.

Holders & the community do not need to know the ins and outs of all personnel decisions, but Sushi should provide something akin to an org chart publicly so we are aware of who is on Sushi payroll at all times (anon or not).

Key KPIs:
-New Users (unique wallets)
-Protocol Revenue (with a clear definition)

It’s a faux pas to mention price to many of you, especially as a compensation KPI but don’t think of it in the sense of bag pumping, thing of it in the long term health of the protocol. It’s correlated and encapsulates all of the other KPIs, plus intangibles. There’s more skin in the game to manage the Sushi from all aspects from the brand to the new users, not to to just keep building.

I think we have to figure out how to more easily allow people to contribute. There are constantly volunteers in the Discord. Whether it’s development, guerilla marketing, or other work I think there’s a place for DAOs like Sushi to better leverage their community to do work that will help the team and overall project, without being a full-time employee, or having to be on boarded. We should think about this more.

Look forward to reading other’s thoughts on these topics. I think Sushi will come out stronger as a result of this.


It may also be forced to leave by the dictator

Sushi Contributor List & Compensation so far

In early September, Maki posted that sushi team owns less than 1% of sushi supply and the community was heavily in favor of increasing their compensation after hearing this. Users posted on the forum, in discord and around twitter in favor of increasing comp, but core members did not participate or comment on this.

If this is a big need for core and was supported by the community, why has there been no discussion with the community on increasing the comp of core members? I understand the team is hard at work building, but jumping on a community call or posting on the forum to at least have some discussion on this topic would not take a whole lot of effort.


Boring Crypto and LevX did not leave because being poached. I am not sure about Keno and Mudit, but even if they left because of a better salary elsewhere, why did the CTO not informed the community about the problem and asked for more funds? That’s the most logical thing to do if you want to keep your devs. So how could be sure that the reasons behind some of the leavings are salaries as the CTO is not making a slightest effort to prevent it?
And I still would like to hear a straightforward and simple explanation about why Boring Crypto left just a couple of days after the community voted him the position of “Leading Dev”. Who among the core team were against this? Why they were against?Does the community vote mean anything at all?

As for the compensations, nothing should be discussed before clarifying what “bonuses” and “grants” (and on what bases) the team have received from other projects.


Is fraud in the crypto world really legal? Can no one restrain them?

I am thinking about some ideas and I would like to hear you guys opinions about them.

I agree with xashd opinion. There is a big treasure, so use it. But there has to be a model. I think it is best to have a commission build that starts talking about better compensation. Such ideas always have fine detail that needs to be hammered out, which works best in small groups than whole community talking.

Commission idea 1
I think it would be good to make an ‘ethics commission’ (name needs some work). This commission would discuss ideas how to create more transparency, compensation ect. The commission members are chosen community members that will be obligated to post their work, ideas, progress, development once every two weeks. (See it as a certain newsletter about the commission work). If a commission hammered out an idea/framework, will it be introduced and talked about like an AMA talk. If no flaws are pointed out during the AMA, the idea/framework will be voted on.

Edit Better idea for commission name the ECC (Ethics & Community Commission)


I agree with those points and I would also add the need for a community representative on the core team (non-dev role) with the sole purpose of making sure the project is running smoothly, aiding the team in whichever way they can (management) and also be like a samurai in that they represent the community first and at all costs.

There’s also the idea of just having representatives from the community (chosen by the samurai’s) represent us in certain decisions that need to be made quickly and subtly. This would facilitate the process a lot.

(edit. @SCNightshade proposed merging his idea with this one and I think it’s a great fit. Making a commission by the community members or samurai and the head of that commission could be our representative on the core team)


This is my idea to hopefully bring some checks and balances to Sushi. I will also put it in a proposal.

Sushi Leader - Executive Branch

Hired by Sushi Parliament

No term limits but can be voted out

Responsible for leading DAO vision and overseeing operations. Ensure the community knows about projects and roadmaps—face of the brand.

Sushi leaders cannot hold a seat in parliament.

Sushi Parliament - Congress

Each department of sushi will have a representative

Term Limit / 1 Year







Vote on significant issues within the DAO and raise concerns from their team or contributors.


Representatives are chosen by the majority vote of their team in a public forum. Members can also be removed by the majority vote of parliament or the Ethics Committee.

A parliament member can raise issues for voting, or if the public sushi forum has more than 200 votes, then a member must draft the issue for a vote.

Issues will be voted on and discussed quarterly in a public fourm unless the majority votes for immediate action.

A Major vote is 4/5 members a tie the Sushi leader can act as tie breaker.

Ethics Committee - Judicial System

Five members voted on by the community

Non bias to judge behavior of parliament, core members and contributors

Term Limits / 2 Years

Can be voted out by Sushi Parliament


Oversee transactions, behaviors and use of sushi funds.


Ethics committee can summon any members for public questioning and judgment . They can collect questions from the community and vote on whether the code of ethics has been violated.

Ethics committee decisions be vetoed over if 3/4 Parliament disagree with the judgement.

Public Documents

These are documents that will act as a guideline for how the DAO is run.


This document outlines each branch of governance how they are organized and what duties each are responsible for.

Code of Ethics

This document outline what behaviors are not allowed within the DAO by core members, representatives and contributors. The ethics committee uses this as a guide for judgement.

Bill of Rights

This document outlines the rights and responsibilities of core members and community.

Clarifying Proposals vs Issues

A proposal is any idea the community creates to forward the advancement of the Sushi Product.

The community votes on proposals.

A issue is a internal conflict that effects the core members and contributors of sushi. It can also be any change that will effect how sushi operates or any government documents.

Sushi Parliament votes on issues.

How to implement:

After the Constitution is created, the Sushi Parliament and Ethic committee will be formed.

Core members will vote on their representatives and the community will vote on Ethics Committee members.

Ethics Committee will draft the code of conduct.

After Parliament is formed, they will appoint a Sushi Leader. Together they will create the Sushi Bill of Rights.

Pressing issues such as compensation will be gathered from their team and put to a vote.


It sounds… complicated, I personally would like somehow more simple structure. Like community elect the Leader (CTO) as the rights ((hiring, firing, ops budget , etc) and the duties (making all his decisions and reasons known to the community, etc) of the position will be set in advance. The proposals made by the samurai team (or completely new structure) should have the same weight as the core proposals and the vote result of these proposals should be mandatory… Though I fully support the idea of creating Ethics Committee to “oversee transactions, behaviors and use of sushi funds”.

1 Like

What we need is a Board of Directors that is voted in by token holders.

We cannot have the community vote on EVERY decision. That will create huge amounts of red tape and stifle innovation. We need a clear organizational structure and should take a page out of the playbook of well-established public companies and the successful monitoring that a shareholder sourced and voted Board of Directors offers for a firm/DAO/entity.

Proposed Structure for Decision-Making:

  • Tactical decisions: delegate to trusted decision makers on Core Team; revert to Core Team org chart. If contention, raise to Board of Directors

  • Strategic decisions: delegate to the Board of Directors if information sensitive and no requirement of Treasury funds. If the outcome requires a substantial use of the Treasury assets, it should be held for a vote on the Snapshot like we already do

  • Disputed decisions: if the Core Team and Board of Directors cannot resolve an issue, it will be brought to a vote on Snapshot.

That’s it. Three tiers of decisions. We need to simplify, delegate, and innovate.

** For those concerned about sounding like a company, guess what we are a company. We already have the worst parts of a company – power concentrated in the hands of CTO and back-room dealing. We need the best parts of a (public) company – the shareholder monitoring and accountability provided by an elected Board of Directors.


I don’t think a board of directors voted in my holders will represent the needs of each team at sushi. If we do have a board I feel it must represent the diversity of the community and core team.


It’s known as an independent board of directors and it’s a staple of modern corporations. Core Team makes decisions on their own, but they must answer ultimately to the delegates of the token holders in the Board of Directors.

1 Like

I get what your saying now. I’ll have to think more on ways to simplify a structure. In retro it might be too complex but I feel there’s needs be a way to have checks and a balances. I also feel each team within core needs to be heard. I have seen too many orgs where one department clearly has more power over others. I would like to prevent that

people hold legitimacy, and, in the case of representative democracies, they confer it to others through voting

i like the idea of having a governance structure similar to those used by nation states;

i would add that the voting for parliament members should use a ranked choice voting system


@dangerousfood @0xMaki @OmakaseBar @ayoki

Sushi should be equal parts core run and community run. i.e. a single person on the core team that has been voted in by the community (core leader) strategically brings forth proposals/options that represent what the core team want to accomplish on a consistent basis. Then the community/holders as a whole vote on the options given. One of the options must always be a veto of the proposal if none of the available decisions align with the the community. That being said, if the veto option isn’t the majority vote the two most voted for options on any given proposal will be selected at the core leader’s discretion. This gives the leader the ability to make decisions if he or she feels it’s best for the community even if it’s not the majority’s decision. As an added layer and fail-safe; at any given point the community can decide to vote said core leader out. That is the underlying mechanism for accountability within the system

This creates more of 50/50 relationship between the Sushi community and the core team running the day to day operations. It’s the middle ground of decentralization and proper leadership. Just some thoughts to continue the conversation Sushi family. Cheers.

I sort of like it, but would also prefer it be a bit simpler.

What’s the average FAANG tenure, like 1.8 years? Crypto probably half that. Two years seems like a long time to be appointed to anything. Maybe 8 months terms.

The public documents is a great idea, to outline how the organization runs.

1 Like

This is a really solid idea. Agree, the community shouldn’t be involved in all decisions, no one wants that.

How would any potential Director get on the ballot to be voted on? That’s something to work through.

1 Like

Potential Directors could go through some AMA sessions as an add-on to the weekly calls. At that time, they get asked questions by the community and give background in terms of their experience and general working knowledge of the Sushi protocol.

Then from initial intros, nominees could then be voted on in this forum setting before eventually going to a snapshot?

The pool we are drawing from for nominees should be large but agree there will have to be some means of narrowing down.

1 Like