Sushi Senzu (!仙豆): Using the SushiGuard Router for SUSHI Value

Sushi Senzu (!仙豆)

Abstract: With the SushiGuard router audit progressing nicely OpenMEV will finally be able to work at a production level. This means that a new income source will soon be available to Sushi DAO. We submit this draft proposal so that we can formalize metrics/KPI’s and identify key parameters that can be used to realize stated goals.


OpenMEV originally started in an effort to help subsidize trading costs for users on mainnet ethereum. However, due to issues with internal governance and operations it has not been enabled by default for any sort of considerable time. This system can not work to subsidize trades if it is not on by default. In an effort to provide non-invasive solutions for the general issue of MEV, a new routing contract has been developed that is incentive compatible with users and token holders at Sushi.

We want to know from the community:

  • What goals to target?
  • What metrics are important?
  • What user benefits to target?
  • How much percentage of Sushi should be staked?
  • How much liquidity should Sushi own of $SUSHI?

We can still do gas rebating, however we want to use this source of revenue for maximal impact. This draft proposal aims to derive how best to allocate the profits towards increasing the price of $SUSHI over a period defined in the specification.

SushiGuard Workflow Overview

This is how the SushiGuard Router works (simplified). Profits from backrunning are left in the router for Sushi DAO MultiSig to withdraw via harvest()


start: 5/23/22
end: 8/29/22

SUSHI Supply changes

  • 234,475,266 5/23/22
  • 239,012,321 8/29/22

Total New Sushi Minted: 4,537,055
Fixed Price of $SUSHI/USD 2
Estimated Value of Minted Sushi, Period: 9,074,110
Estimated Value of Minted Sushi, Monthly 2,268,527.5

Potential usages

  • Provide Liquidity: SUSHI / ETH
  • Incentives: new Onsen/Bar Incentives
  • Target a higher SUSHI Stakers: 21.34%[^1] percentage than current
  • Rebate for certain transactional orderflow (gas rebates on specific pairs)


SUSHI Staking Target = sushi_stake_percent_target
SUSHI Staking Current Percentage = sushi_stake_percent_current
Amount of Liquidity for SUSHI / ETH that is * OWNED by SUSHI= sushi_liquidity_amount_eth
Percentage of Liquidity for SUSHI / ETH that is OWNED by SUSHI = sushi_liquidity_percent_eth

Suggestions welcomed for targeting parameters

[^1]source, dune analytics


Korin : See, you should move like you speak. With purpose and clear direction. Commit your mind and focus. Distraction is the root of all failure.

Let’s commit to a concrete measure for success. How much of SushiGuard Revenue can we use to get $SUSHI to $17.50 by the end of August?

Yes thats $17.50 by the end of August 2023. 100% Doable.


  • Yes, profits from SushiGuard should be used for Optimizations
  • No, profits from SushiGuard should be deposited into the DAO Treasury

0 voters


Senzu Beans (仙豆 Senzu , lit. “Hermit Bean”) are mystical beans with immense rejuvenation properties. Lets find these fucking beans (a.k.a parameters)


All optimizations are positive, lfg

1 Like

Not going to lie Ive read this a few times over and Im still not sure what the ask is


Are there numbers available of how many transactions or percentage of transactions are making use of the sushiguard router currently?

What percentage of the profit goes to which stakeholders, i.e. fold stakers, sam bacha, bribes for the miners, sushi community, …

Some thoughts I have, I think gas rebate is not the way to go. Actually I tried sushiguard router once, but I never received a rebate.
I have concerns with MEV anyhow, imo profit ultimately will go to the miners. With this implementation you are saying you can make profit by arbitraging from the users of the Sushiguard router. Which imo is somewhat questionable in itself. I would rather be protected from any arbitrageurs. Even though you are saying to look for a way to return profits to the community.
Also concerned how you make sure that your batch of transactions is accepted by the miners and placed in front of any other searcher’s transaction, are there any agreements made with the miners? I.e. If I want to run my own arbitrage bot, would you advise to run it over your sushiguard router, or should I better go to flashbots or eden relay?

Can you explain how optimization occurs? Too much seems to be folded into that word. It’s unclear what’s being suggested by it.

What generates these profits and who “owns” them?

YAcademy Audit done: openmev-router-docs/audit at master · manifoldfinance/openmev-router-docs · GitHub