Fwiw, the reason I’ve held strong to the compensation piece is I think it is terribly important for us to have multi-sig signers who are incentivized and care about Sushi’s future. Those individuals should be compensated for their time.
There will be more messages, more communications, more due diligence. I had previously recommended a number of approximately $1,000 per month. Signers do not get wealthy, but are recognized for the efforts and encouraged to stay engaged. Offering the compensation in SUSHI is better towards incentivizing and keeping committed to a positive future. Assuming it goes up in value, the compensation can be significant. There is the alternative: SUSHI going down in value.
Further, I view a multi-signer position as similar to a board position (or what could be co-opted into a board position). We should be looking for people who expect to do more than just click buttons for this position. Can they offer more? How do we encourage them to offer more to grow Sushi?
Finally, and not of least importance, there is a liability issue. Control over the treasury comes with the potential for significant personal risk. I’m limiting this by creating an LLC. But Sushi does not offer professional insurance (errors and omission nor directors and officers liability insurance). Multi-sig signers may be on their own if someone decides to sue.
We are not afraid to compensate our Head Chef generously. But the multi-sig signers may be taking on significant risk for little reward. I expect we’ll be taking on more responsibility as well.
These are the items I’ve factored in with regards to what I believe to be an appropriate compensation level for the role.
Thanks, Maka. Happy to be considered. Hope I can provide some value beyond clicking buttons and do expect it to be more time consuming and of greater importance than clicking confirm. Think it is good to have signers who are invested in properly administering the treasury.
Agree entirely. As a maturing DEX, we have to be aware of the real world. And a real world within a bad market. When people like to blame others for losses.
Honestly, this list feels like a slap in my face. So many people on the forum and the discord knew about my attempts to put a notice on the fact that the current signers are not active enough for this DAO.
I am advocating a change in signers since the passing of the TOKE proposal because the implementation of the proposal took too much time. Even on the last proposal on the rotation of the signer I was an active member of the DAO and suggest some people that are very active members of this community to be signers. See link to see my suggestion of signers and the original proposal:
No one of the people I propose got selected, and I highly doubt they were even considered. Even, after the comment on the forum, I was discussing it in the discord and suggested people that could be possible signers (when a CORE member of sushi asked to name a few possible signers).
I also dislike the fact that the procedure of the selection is not communicated to the DAO as a whole (at least not to my knowledge).
I expected more from you @Tangle, and I personally hate that I am writing such a negative comment on a proposal on a sushi member that I respect.
Totally agreed that multi-signers are actually the board members or trustees. Independent board members for companies at certain scale are usually paid 10k-30k USD p.a.
2.5k is way too underpaid and would create an adverse selection effect.
However, if multi-signers are like board members, then I guess multi-signers should also commit more on the governance and supervision. Any good idea on that?
I have not yet formed any good ideas on it. Personally, depending on compensation decided, I would expect to play a more active role (within authority of a trustee/board member). Helpful whenever the core team, head chef, and samurai are in need of assistance without being in the way. Essentially acting in an advisory capacity.
Have taken a couple days of unplugging but thinking about your comment. Specifically, the item that caught my attention was:
This is probably something we should look at if the process was not transparent. We had some similar issues regarding transparency in choosing a head chef, and we came back and corrected that process.
I do not believe selection of multisig participants has to be run as in-depth as the Head Chef position. But transparency is important to the governance experiment we’re all participating in.
I am curious though if we could take this proposal a step further, and maybe try to establish a little of a process for treasury members going forward.
This way if something were to come up like one member wanting to leave or someone not having as much time in the future, then we’d have something to follow on the transition.
I would support this. Sounds like you’re thinking an onboarding and off-boarding process for multisig?
Would imagine any multisig signer could propose their removal at any time. That would make sense. Assuming they don’t make the proposal themselves, we’d need to have some process in place.
As I’m seeing it right now, I may have to respectfully bow out. I’m not sure the compensation will be worth the potential liability.
But a transparent process for most positions should be supported.
I too support this - it sounds similar to a CU facilitator off-boarding in Maker.
One limitation is fully replacing these members requires two separate votes (Off-boarding & Onboarding), increasing the total vote load and placing more burden on voters.
I would advocate for a replacement-style proposal where signing duty can be transitioned to their predecessor in a single vote.
This allows for more speed and prevents an old signer from becoming disenfranchised; they must help identify a proper fit for the DAO first.
In addition, regulation by enforcement is here and staying. These signer/board roles are putting themselves in the line of fire. They should be fairly compensated and Sushi should also promise to protect them as best as possible.
Sushi needs to figure out proactively what its approach is going to be and should act now. Yes, that includes the legal entity and indemnification, but it also includes taking a complete view of everything, especially product strategy and decentralization. Sushi needs to form a point of view on whether and how to comply and what that means for the product.
What are the options for decentralization and what’s sufficiently decentralized for compliance purposes? Could even the front end be decentralized by having users download code and run it themselves in an electron app or something similar? What else is possible? What risks are the signers/board members/team willing to accept?
I have no answers, but I want to recommend that Sushi and the new Head Chef dedicate serious resources to this and quickly.
Just asked around a bit in the Sushi forum #99 if community members can also be signers instead of high-profile crypto experts.
As my motivation, I would say that for example myself: I always read a lot on the forum but rarely post as I’m not a giga-brain. I do vote with my POWAH even though I’m not the biggest holder by far.
I’m also very active in the discord and care a lot about Sushi as a whole, as I truly see the future potential in it.
So my question is, can “simple” community members that are not high-profile crypto bigbrains, but that do have a big interest in Sushi succeeding in the coming years, also take a bit of care of the protocol and help with signing for example?
If this would be a possibility, I would love to sign myself up as a nominee for helping out and getting things done with signing the multisig!
Hey, first of all, congrats on being the new head chef !
I mean, there are, in a lot of countries, a lot of legal implications if you are the owner of a key who control the treasury.
If you have the keys, you can be " legally accountable " for a lot of things.
Example here :
More recently, we have seen the legislation being harder against DEX and the fact that Sushi is earning fees from the protocol is clearly a way for regulator to call us " centralized ". If I remember correctly, that’s one of the reason of why Uniswap don’t earn fees from volume and didn’t activate this option.
That’s why, as far I know, a lot of former ( and not former ) core team members living in USA have been removed from the multisig. I can remember some internal discussions about this situation to avoid some risks.
So the question : Is a multisig signer legally accountable for sushi actions ? and if yes, do they have a legal protection from Sushi ?
Glad atleast your honest with numbers atleast as far as i can tell but god damn what a slap in the face to every person out there busting their ass to put food on the table.
This is a fair concern @GoldenNaim - and something I think about myself.
As we have seen unpredictable regulatory rulings towards DAOs, it is best to consider the legal implications imposed on signers; because of this we must be willing to compensate for their risk.
I applaud the willingness of community members to step up and advocate for higher compensation.
After discussions with the community on how to manage a fluctuating USD amount in SUSHI tokens, it would be challenging to maintain and monitor this, plus introduces point where there may need to be more or less SUSHI added, or the stream would need to stop all together, thus presenting incentive issues.
Proposing a 10,000 USDC stream through Furo for each signer.
These streams are to be started and managed by Sushi Operations for simplicity and coordination.
